CS70: Discussion Format

Small group:

Three modes of working.

- (A) Individual working.
- (B) Pairs working together.
- (C) Pairs: one works/one forces talking.

Supported by course staff and course volunteers.

Why? It works better for learning.

Evidence:

- (1) Experience. (years and years, faculty agree.)
- (2) Literature.

Students hate it.

Students happy(in the moment): negatively correlated to learning. See marshmallow test. Delayed gratification.

Our job is to have you learn.

We would like you to be "happy" in the moment.

But the result is what is important.

Be nice to the TA's. It's not them. It's the Rao.

Do you remember the first lecture?

Veritassium on Khan




Fig. 1. Final recall (a) after repeatedly studying a text in four study periods (SSSS condition), reading a text in one study period and then recalling it in one retrieval period (SSSR condition), or reading a text in one study period and then repeatedly recalling it in three retrieval periods (SRRR condition). Judgments of learning (b) were made on a 7-point scale, where 7 indicated that students believed they would remember material very well. The data presented in these graphs are adapted from Experiment 2 of Reedger and Karpicke (2006b). The pattern of students' metacognitive judgments of learning (predicted recall) was exactly the opposite of the pattern of students' actual long-term retention.

CS70: Lecture 9. Outline.

- 1. Public Key Cryptography
- 2. RSA system
 - 2.1 Efficiency: Repeated Squaring.
 - 2.2 Correctness: Fermat's Theorem.
 - 2.3 Construction.
- 3. Warnings.

Simple Chinese Remainder Theorem.

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My love is won. Zero and One. Nothing and nothing done.
Find x = a \pmod{m} and x = b \pmod{n} where gcd(m, n) = 1.
CRT Thm: There is a unique solution x \pmod{mn}.
Proof (solution exists):
Consider u = n(n^{-1} \pmod{m}).
 u = 0 \pmod{n} u = 1 \pmod{m}
Consider v = m(m^{-1} \pmod{n}).
 v = 1 \pmod{n} v = 0 \pmod{m}
Let x = au + bv.
 x = a \pmod{m} since bv = 0 \pmod{m} and au = a \pmod{m}
 x = b \pmod{n} since au = 0 \pmod{n} and bv = b \pmod{n}
This shows there is a solution.
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Simple Chinese Remainder Theorem.

CRT Thm: There is a unique solution $x \pmod{mn}$.

Proof (uniqueness):

If not, two solutions, *x* and *y*.

$$(x-y) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$$
 and $(x-y) \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$.
 $\implies (x-y)$ is multiple of m and n
 $\gcd(m,n)=1 \implies \text{no common primes in factorization } m$ and n
 $\implies mn|(x-y)$
 $\implies x-y \ge mn \implies x,y \notin \{1,\ldots,mn-1\}.$
 $(\text{e.g., } m=2,n=5,x,y\in\{1,\ldots,9\} \implies x-y<10.)$

Thus, only one solution modulo *mn*.

Isomorphisms.

Bijection:

$$f(x) = ax \pmod{m}$$
 if $gcd(a, m) = 1$.

Simplified Chinese Remainder Theorem:

If gcd(n, m) = 1, there is unique $x \pmod{mn}$ where $x = a \pmod{m}$ and $x = b \pmod{n}$.

Bijection between $(a \pmod{n}, b \pmod{m})$ and $x \pmod{mn}$.

Consider m = 5, n = 9, then if (a, b) = (3, 7) then $x = 43 \pmod{45}$.

Consider (a', b') = (2,4), then $x = 22 \pmod{45}$.

Now consider: (a,b) + (a',b') = (0,2).

What is x where $x = 0 \pmod{5}$ and $x = 2 \pmod{9}$?

Try $43 + 22 = 65 = 20 \pmod{45}$.

Is it 0 (mod 5)? Yes! Is it 2 (mod 9)? Yes!

Isomorphism:

the actions under (mod 5), (mod 9) correspond to actions in (mod 45)!

Poll

$$x = 5 \mod 7$$
 and $x = 5 \mod 6$
 $y = 4 \mod 7$ and $y = 3 \mod 6$

What's true?

- (A) $x + y = 2 \mod 7$
- (B) $x + y = 2 \mod 6$
- (C) $xy = 3 \mod 6$
- (D) $xy = 6 \mod 7$
- (E) $x = 5 \mod 42$
- (F) $y = 39 \mod 42$

All true.

Xor

```
Computer Science:
 1 - True
 0 - False
1 \lor 1 = 1
1 \lor 0 = 1
0 \lor 1 = 1
0 \lor 0 = 0
A \oplus B - Exclusive or.
1 \oplus 1 = 0
1 \oplus 0 = 1
0 \oplus 1 = 1
0 \oplus 0 = 0
Note: Also modular addition modulo 2!
```

 $\{0,1\}$ is set. Take remainder for 2. Property: $A \oplus B \oplus B = A$. By cases: $1 \oplus 1 \oplus 1 = 1$

Cryptography ...



Example:

One-time Pad: secret s is string of length |m|.

$$m = 10101011110101101$$

$$E(m,s)$$
 – bitwise $m \oplus s$.

$$D(x,s)$$
 – bitwise $x \oplus s$.

Works because $m \oplus s \oplus s = m!$

...and totally secure!

...given E(m, s) any message m is equally likely.

Disadvantages:

Shared secret!

Uses up one time pad..or less and less secure.

Public key crypography.

$$m = D(E(m, K), k)$$

Private: k

Public: K

Message m
 $E(m, K)$

Bob

Eve

Everyone knows key K!Bob (and Eve and me and you and you ...) can encode. Only Alice knows the secret key k for public key K. (Only?) Alice can decode with k.

Is this even possible?

Is public key crypto possible?

No. In a sense. One can try every message to "break" system.

Too slow. Does it have to be slow?

We don't know for sure. But wethink so?

...but we do public-key cryptography constantly!!!

RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman)

Pick two large primes p and q. Let N = pq.

Choose *e* relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1).¹

Compute $d = e^{-1} \mod (p-1)(q-1)$.

Announce $N(=p \cdot q)$ and e: K = (N, e) is my public key!

Encoding: $mod(x^e, N)$.

Decoding: $mod(y^d, N)$.

Does $D(E(m)) = m^{ed} = m \mod N$?

Yes!

¹Typically small, say e = 3.

Poll

What is a piece of RSA?

Bob has a key (N,e,d). Alice is good, Eve is evil.

- (A) Eve knows e and N.
- (B) Alice knows *e* and *N*.
- (C) $ed = 1 \pmod{N-1}$
- (D) Bob forgot p and q but can still decode?
- (E) Bob knows d
- (F) $ed = 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ if N = pq.
- (A), (B), (D), (E), (F)

Iterative Extended GCD.

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Example: p = 7, q = 11.

N = 77.

(p-1)(q-1) = 60

Choose e = 7, since gcd(7,60) = 1.

egcd(7,60).
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$$7(0)+60(1) = 60$$

 $7(1)+60(0) = 7$
 $7(-8)+60(1) = 4$
 $7(9)+60(-1) = 3$
 $7(-17)+60(2) = 1$

Confirm:
$$-119 + 120 = 1$$

 $d = e^{-1} = -17 = 43 = \pmod{60}$

Encryption/Decryption Techniques.

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Public Key: (77,7) Message Choices: \{0,\ldots,76\}. Message: 2! E(2)=2^e=2^7\equiv 128=51\pmod{77} D(51)=51^{43}\pmod{77} uh oh! Obvious way: 43 multiplications. Ouch. In general, O(N) or O(2^n) multiplications!
```

Repeated squaring.

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Notice: 43 = 32 + 8 + 2 + 1 or 101011 in binary.
51^{43} = 51^{32+8+2+1} = 51^{32} \cdot 51^8 \cdot 51^2 \cdot 51^1 \pmod{77}.
3 multiplications sort of...
Need to compute 51<sup>32</sup>...51<sup>1</sup>.?
51^1 \equiv 51 \pmod{77}
51^2 = (51) * (51) = 2601 \equiv 60 \pmod{77}
51^4 = (51^2) * (51^2) = 60 * 60 = 3600 \equiv 58 \pmod{77}
51^8 = (51^4) * (51^4) = 58 * 58 = 3364 \equiv 53 \pmod{77}
51^{16} = (51^8) * (51^8) = 53 * 53 = 2809 \equiv 37 \pmod{77}
51^{32} = (51^{16}) * (51^{16}) = 37 * 37 = 1369 \equiv 60 \pmod{77}
5 more multiplications.
51^{32} \cdot 51^8 \cdot 51^2 \cdot 51^1 = (60) * (53) * (60) * (51) \equiv 2 \pmod{77}.
Decoding got the message back!
Repeated Squaring took 8 multiplications versus 42.
```

Repeated Squaring: x^y

Repeated squaring $O(\log y)$ multiplications versus y!!!

- 1. x^y : Compute $x^1, x^2, x^4, ..., x^{2^{\lfloor \log y \rfloor}}$.
- 2. Multiply together x^i where the $(\log(i))$ th bit of y (in binary) is 1. Example: 43 = 101011 in binary.

$$x^{43} = x^{32} * x^8 * x^2 * x^1$$
.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$.

All *n*-bit numbers.

Repeated Squaring:

O(n) multiplications.

 $O(n^2)$ time per multiplication.

 \Longrightarrow $O(n^3)$ time.

Conclusion: $x^y \mod N$ takes $O(n^3)$ time.

Recursive.

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x^{y}.

y is even, y = 2k, x^{y} = x^{2k} = (x^{2})^{k}.

power (x,y) = \text{power } (x^{2}, y/2).

y is odd, y = 2k + 1, x^{y} = x^{2k} = (x^{2})^{k}.

power (x,y) = x * \text{power } (x^{2}, y/2).

Base case: x^{0} = 1.
```

RSA is pretty fast.

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \mod N$. All n-bit numbers. $O(n^3)$ time.

Remember RSA encoding/decoding!

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.$$

 $D(m,(N,d)) = m^d \pmod{N}.$

For 512 bits, a few hundred million operations. Easy, peasey.

Decoding.

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.$$

 $D(m,(N,d)) = m^d \pmod{N}.$
 $N = pq$ and $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}.$
Want: $(m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m \pmod{N}.$

Always decode correctly?

$$E(m,(N,e)) = m^e \pmod{N}.$$

$$D(m,(N,d)) = m^d \pmod{N}.$$

$$N = pq \text{ and } d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}.$$
Want: $(m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m \pmod{N}.$
Another view:
$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} \iff ed = k(p-1)(q-1) + 1.$$
Consider...

Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

$$\Rightarrow a^{k(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \Rightarrow a^{k(p-1)+1} = a \pmod{p}$$
versus $a^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} = a \pmod{pq}$.

Similar, not same, but useful.

Correct decoding...

Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$,

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}.$$

Proof: Consider $S = \{a \cdot 1, \dots, a \cdot (p-1)\}.$

All different modulo p since a has an inverse modulo p. S contains representative of $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$ modulo p.

$$(a\cdot 1)\cdot (a\cdot 2)\cdots (a\cdot (p-1))\equiv 1\cdot 2\cdots (p-1)\mod p,$$

Since multiplication is commutative.

$$a^{(p-1)}(1\cdots(p-1))\equiv (1\cdots(p-1))\mod p.$$

Each of $2, \dots (p-1)$ has an inverse modulo p, solve to get...

$$a^{(p-1)} \equiv 1 \mod p$$
.

Poll

Mark what is true.

```
(A) 2^7 = 1 \mod 7
(B) 2^6 = 1 \mod 7
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(B)
$$2^6 = 1 \mod 7$$

(C)
$$2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5, 2^6, 2^7$$
 are distinct mod 7.

(D)
$$2^{1}, 2^{2}, 2^{3}, 2^{4}, 2^{5}, 2^{6}$$
 are distinct mod 7

(E)
$$2^{15} = 2 \mod 7$$

(F)
$$2^{15} = 1 \mod 7$$

(B), (F)

Always decode correctly? (cont.)

Fermat's Little Theorem: For prime p, and $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$,

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$
.

Lemma 1: For any prime p and any a, b, $a^{1+b(p-1)} \equiv a \pmod{p}$

Proof:

If $a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, "trivially".

Otherwise

$$a^{1+b(p-1)} \equiv a^1 * (a^{p-1})^b \equiv a * (1)^b \equiv a \pmod{p}$$

...Decoding correctness...

Lemma 1: For any prime p and any a, b, $a^{1+b(p-1)} \equiv a \pmod{p}$

Lemma 2: For any two different primes p, q and any x, k, $x^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv x \pmod{pq}$

Proof: True for x = 0.

Let a = x, b = k(p-1) and apply Lemma 1 with modulus q.

$$x^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv x \pmod{q}$$

Let a = x, b = k(q-1) and apply Lemma 1 with modulus p.

$$x^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv x \pmod{p}$$

 $x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} - x$ is multiple of p and q

$$x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} - x \equiv 0 \mod (pq) \implies x^{1+k(q-1)(p-1)} = x \mod pq.$$

Also from CRT:

$$y = x \pmod{p}$$
 and $y = x \pmod{q} \implies y = x \pmod{pq}$.

RSA decodes correctly..

Lemma 2: For any two different primes p, q and any x, k, $x^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv x \pmod{pq}$

Theorem: RSA correctly decodes!

Recall

$$D(E(x)) = (x^e)^d = x^{ed} \equiv x \pmod{pq},$$

where
$$ed \equiv 1 \mod (p-1)(q-1) \Longrightarrow ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)$$
$$x^{ed} \equiv x^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \equiv x \pmod{pq}.$$

Construction of keys....

1. Find large (100 digit) primes *p* and *q*?

Prime Number Theorem: $\pi(N)$ number of primes less than N. For all $N \ge 17$

$$\pi(N) \geq N/\ln N$$
.

Choosing randomly gives approximately $1/(\ln N)$ chance of number being a prime. (How do you tell if it is prime? ... cs170..Miller-Rabin test.. Primes in P).

For 1024 bit number, 1 in 710 is prime.

- 2. Choose e with gcd(e,(p-1)(q-1)) = 1. Use gcd algorithm to test.
- 3. Find inverse d of e modulo (p-1)(q-1). Use extended gcd algorithm.

All steps are polynomial in $O(\log N)$, the number of bits.

Security of RSA.

Security?

- 1. Alice knows p and q.
- Bob only knows, N(= pq), and e.
 Does not know, for example, d or factorization of N.
- 3. I don't know how to break this scheme without factoring N.

No one I know or have heard of admits to knowing how to factor N. Breaking in general sense \implies factoring algorithm.

Much more to it.....

If Bobs sends a message (Credit Card Number) to Alice, Eve sees it.

Eve can send credit card again!!

The protocols are built on RSA but more complicated; For example, several rounds of challenge/response.

One trick:

Bob encodes credit card number, *c*, concatenated with random *k*-bit number *r*.

Never sends just c.

Again, more work to do to get entire system.

CS161...

Hmmm..

How do you get Amazon's key?

Browser asks Amazon!

"Person in middle", pretending to be Amazon?

Browser shipped with say just one key.

The "authority."

When Amazon provides key, it provides signature from authority.

Signature can be verified by browser, since it has key.

Signatures using RSA.

$$[C, S_{v}(C)] \qquad C = E(S_{V}(C), k_{V})?$$

$$[C, S_{v}(C)] \qquad [C, S_{v}(C)]$$

$$Amazon \qquad Browser. K_{v}$$

Certificate Authority: Verisign, GoDaddy, DigiNotar,...

Verisign's key: $K_V = (N, e)$ and $k_V = d$ (N = pq.)

Browser "knows" Verisign's public key: K_V .

Amazon Certificate: C ="I am Amazon. My public Key is K_A ."

Versign signature of $C: S_v(C): D(C, k_V) = C^d \mod N$.

Browser receives: [C, y]

Checks $E(y, K_V) = C$?

$$E(S_{\nu}(C),K_{V})=(S_{\nu}(C))^{e}=(C^{d})^{e}=C^{de}=C \pmod{N}$$

Valid signature of Amazon certificate C!

Security: Eve can't forge unless she "breaks" RSA scheme.

RSA

Public Key Cryptography:

$$D(E(m,K),k) = (m^e)^d \mod N = m.$$

Signature scheme:

$$E(D(C,k),K) = (C^d)^e \mod N = C$$

Poll

Signature authority has public key (N,e).

- (A) Given message/signature (x,y): check $y^d = x \pmod{N}$
- (B) Given message/signature (x, y): check $y^e = x \pmod{N}$
- (C) Signature of message x is $x^e \pmod{N}$
- (D) Signature of message x is $x^d \pmod{N}$

Other Eve.

Get CA to certify fake certificates: Microsoft Corporation. 2001..Doh.

... and August 28, 2011 announcement.

DigiNotar Certificate issued for Microsoft!!!

How does Microsoft get a CA to issue certificate to them ...

and only them?

Summary.

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Public-Key Encryption.
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RSA Scheme:

$$N = pq$$
 and $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.

$$E(x) = x^e \pmod{N}$$
.

$$D(y) = y^d \pmod{N}.$$

Repeated Squaring \implies efficiency.

Fermat's Theorem \implies correctness.

Good for Encryption and Signature Schemes.